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It is well known even to non-economists that the United States has   
experienced rapidly rising health care costs and an epidemic of inferior 
health care quality over the past decade. It is now becoming clear that, 
to some degree, these two phenomena are closely related to each other. 
In 2004, the United States spent just short of $1.8 trillion on health 
care. Many are seeking ways to reduce health care spending, but given 
demographic changes in the U.S. population and the ongoing stream of   
diagnostic and treatment breakthroughs, the real questions may be about 
how to get more value for what is spent and how to get a more normal 
market for health care services. Addressing these questions underlies much 
of the effort by the George W. Bush administration to deal with health 
care services in general, and health care information technology (IT) in   
particular. 
The mission of the Ofﬁce of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology is to execute the actions ordered by President 
Bush in his April 2004 Executive Order, which calls for the widespread 
deployment of health information technology within the next 10 years.1 
The backdrop for that is a variety of reports that health care has been 
very slow to adopt IT. FedEx knows the location of every package any-
where in the world at any point in time, yet a medical record can be very 
hard for a doctor to ﬁnd in a timely fashion. The difference is in the use 
of modern information technology; hence, the administration’s efforts to 
address this issue. 
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The Cost and Quality of U.S. Health Care
Consumers bear the real cost of health care through wage offsets or through 
higher prices for U.S. output. This is obvious enough to economists, but 
what is obvious to economists may be obscure to others. The United States 
has enormously high health care costs, but the core issue is that it is hard 
for economists to demonstrate to the general population the value of what 
Americans get for those costs compared with what people in other coun-
tries can get for their health care spending. Despite obviously superior 
research and development, obviously superior access to services for those 
who are in the system, and obviously superior training and development of 
specialized services and professions, the United States does not necessarily 
have a superior health care system. Somehow, these core advantages do 
not translate into population longevity and the quality of life that health 
care is supposed to bring to our population. In this milieu, the Ofﬁce of the 
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology views its role 
as part of a larger effort to make the U.S. economy more competitive in 
terms of how well our goods and services perform in a global market, and 
in terms of Americans’ standard of living. 
Over the past 10 years, the Institute of Medicine reports have put into 
the American consciousness the idea that health care does not just go 
wrong occasionally—it goes wrong all the time. Estimates indicate that 
up to 100,000 people die each year from inpatient medical errors, and 
up to two million people are injured annually from ambulatory medical 
errors. Today, this crisis has become apparent to many Americans—not 
just as dry statistics, but in the form of their life experiences or the life 
experiences of their family members—and has brought us into a world 
where issues of quality and safety resonate with the public. This nation 
has dealt with some of the small problems of health care, but the topic 
of health IT has become the catalyst for renewed discussion of big health 
care policy questions. Health IT is a topic that has captured the imagina-
tion of Americans—from the president to the public at large. 
The Role of Information Technology in the Health Care System
It is clear that investments in information technology in many industries 
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and his colleagues recently updated their work on productivity change 
and found that from 1995 to 2003, average labor productivity grew by 
3.06 percent per year. Information technology alone contributed almost 
half of this, accounting for 1.45 percent per year (Jorgenson, Ho, and 
Stiroh 2004, Table 1). Moreover, this robust trend, and the role that 
investment in information technology played in it, is likely to continue 
for the foreseeable future. 
The trend of IT-driven productivity growth has been led by industries 
like telecom, which clearly derive scale beneﬁts from investment in tech-
nology. But even retail, which is an industry much more like health care in 
terms of its labor intensity and local customization, has seen substantial 
beneﬁts. So, why not health care? Why is it that this industry has failed to 
realize similar beneﬁts? It is because health care is not adopting informa-
tion technology in a purposeful way. There is good evidence that if the 
United States were to invest in health care IT, it would realize a substan-
tial payoff. Estimates of beneﬁt range quite broadly, as one would expect, 
given the size of the health care industry and the extrapolations that these 
estimates require. It is estimated that savings could range anywhere from 
7.5 percent of health care costs (Johnston et al. 2003; Pan et al. 2004) 
to as high as 30 percent (Wennberg et al. 2002; Wennberg et al. 2004; 
Fisher et al. 2003a; Fisher et al. 2003b). The low numbers represent the 
core savings that would arise from a reduction of medical errors. These 
numbers may seem very large, but take medical errors as one example. 
A medical error costs, in 2003 dollars, about $3,700 (Bates et al. 1997), 
and early studies indicate that somewhere between 70 and 80 percent of 
those errors could be eliminated (Evans et al. 1998; Bates et al. 1998). 
Most of these are prescribing errors, whereby the patient ends up getting 
the wrong drug, the wrong dose of a drug, or the right drug given at the 
wrong time. Such errors lead to a variety of consequences, including fur-
ther diagnostic evaluation of the patient and additional treatments. They 
can also result in serious complications that require additional interven-
tions and may even result in death. Unfortunately, $3,700 is a lot of 
money—except in health care, where it buys just a few lab tests and 
maybe an imaging scan and a half-day in the hospital. 
Reducing medical errors can save up to 7.5 percent of our health care 
expenditures. Going beyond this, up to the 30 percent savings, requires a 
much more substantial transformation of care delivery that goes beyond 
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simple error reduction. It requires the industry to follow the best diagnos-
tic and treatment practices everywhere in the nation. For example, cho-
lesterol screening can lead to early treatment, which in turn can reduce 
the risk of heart disease. Where that has been done, there have been sub-
stantial savings on cardiac expenditures. Investments in mammography 
to detect breast cancer at early stages incur substantial up-front expendi-
tures but realize substantial long-run savings. There are many examples, 
including asthma, diabetes, and lung disease—some of the major killers 
of Americans. The transformation of care delivery and the achievement 
of savings of up to 30 percent represent the potential for what could 
be realized if health care undertook a large-scale industry restructuring. 
These are big savings, but they also require remarkable changes in the 
way the industry operates.
Interoperability
The Center for Information Technology Leadership in Boston recently 
conducted a study demonstrating that if the health care system were 
interoperable—that is, if patients’ information were shared across 
health care settings so that personal health information seamlessly fol-
lowed any patient through various settings of care—$77 billion would 
be saved annually (Pan et al. 2005). The methods used in this study 
were conservative, so this is a lower bound for the economic beneﬁts of   
interoperability. 
Interoperability is becoming increasingly important in a world of 
increasing health care specialization. In fact, most consumers receive 
care from multiple different health care organizations: a laboratory, a 
pharmacy, a physician’s ofﬁce, a specialist, a hospital, and more. But the 
data are held by each one of these organizations and shared only via 
the manual exchange of paper. There is no concept of portability of an 
individual’s information. People do not really have longitudinal records 
unless they, like many Americans, keep their own set of records. And   
The Kaiser Family Foundation reported recently (The Kaiser Family 
Foundation, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, and Har-
vard School of Public Health 2004) that 32 percent of Americans carry 
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Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality, or the Harvard School of Public Health) because when they 
show up in a clinical setting like an emergency room, they do not want 
the doctor to rely on guesses for decisions: Why was an ambulatory sur-
gical procedure performed last week? What is this little blue pill? And, 
why is it taken? These consumers also do not like to report to a doctor’s 
ofﬁce or hospital and ﬁll out the same form multiple times or run the 
risk of having clinicians fail to understand allergies or other things that 
have already been tested for or examined. Currently, as soon as a patient 
arrives at a hospital, a battery of tests is performed regardless of whether 
they have been done previously, because clinicians have no way of know-
ing what has already been done. 
Eliminating this inefﬁciency and frustration through interoperability 
represents a signiﬁcant challenge. It does not, however, require magical 
changes in the business processes or culture of health care to be realized. 
It is really about obtaining data by calling it up on a computer system 
rather than waiting for medical records to be delivered. 
Imagine the circumstance of a physician trying to deal with a com-
plicated, life-threatening condition (such as immune deﬁciency) that has 
substantial turnover of knowledge on a month-to-month basis, and sort-
ing through a banker’s box of photocopies of physicians’ impenetrable 
handwriting. This is routine health care every day—for every doctor, for 
every nurse. Thus, it is no big surprise that there are substantial potential 
savings from interoperability, because what it stands for is the deﬁnition 
of a standardized record and the hardware and software that enable por-
tability—and $77 billion in savings. 
Computerized Physician Order Entry
The Center for Information Technology Leadership also did a study on 
the use of computerized physician order entry (CPOE), which corrobo-
rated ﬁndings from a number of other studies (Johnston 2003). They 
estimated that if physicians used computers to order tests in their out-
patient practices, our system would save $34 billion per year. Consider 
the following reasonably likely chain of events: The physician writes a 
patient a prescription. The patient goes to the pharmacy, which informs 
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her that the drug is not in her health plan’s formulary, so she will have to 
pay $125. She says that she does not want to spend more than $5 and is 
sent back to the doctor for a different medication. The doctor gives her 
a new prescription, but then the pharmacist asks her the magic question 
that the doctor did not: Is she allergic to this? If she says yes, she has 
to go through the whole process over again. If they do not ask her, she 
could have a dangerous episode from a drug reaction, and could be sicker 
than she was before her treatment. By using a computer to order drugs, a 
physician can determine which drug is best for the patient, the safe dose 
of the drug, whether the health plan will pay for it, whether the patient 
has allergies or potential interactions with other drugs that she is taking, 
and can transmit the prescription to the pharmacy without handwriting 
errors—all in real-time while the patient is with the physician. 
Prescribing a drug using computerized systems has value. But this is 
only one example of how value can be realized from the use of infor-
mation tools in health care. And this value accrues both to consumers, 
who are safer and less hassled, and to America’s employers. The Center 
for Information Technology Leadership estimates that 89 percent of the 
economic beneﬁts of computerized order entry accrues to the holder of 
ﬁnancial risk for health care—most often the large employer (Johnston et 
al. 2003). This is why so many large employers are looking at how they 
can support health IT adoption. 
Barriers to Health Care IT
Now, if health care IT is such a great thing—making lives better, lives 
safer, saving money—why is it not being done already? Why does the 
president have to appoint someone in an ofﬁcial role to go out and get 
this done? Why can’t the market address this on its own? And why is it 
that economists and others have meetings about this? The reason is that 
health care IT faces a very challenging economic milieu, one aspect of 
which involves the externalities of quality. The beneﬁts of IT accrue to 
payers, and not to providers who make health IT investments. This is 
because our system pays for volume and not for quality. It pays for a doc-
tor’s seeing a patient, or a patient’s stay in a hospital bed, or the perform-
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better, more pain-free, longer, and more productive. It pays for quantity 
rather than quality, because the payment system in the United States was 
developed in the 1960s when it was not possible to measure the ﬁnal 
economic or health status value of health care investments. There were 
no data, and there was no theory of outcomes then. Without any of these 
pieces, reimbursement focused on the intermediate product, which was: 
“Did the patient see a doctor?” It did not even pay based on whether the 
treatment was appropriate for a patient’s condition. It just paid based on 
whether a doctor did a test or evaluation or procedure of some type. That 
payment system is still here today, and it actually preserves incentives for 
poor quality. One example is hospital reimbursement that is based on 
“diagnosis related groups” (DRGs), a case-mix classiﬁcation system that 
groups together patients who are similar in terms of diagnosis, treatment, 
and consumption of hospital resources. The intent of DRGs in billing 
was standardization and efﬁciency. However, DRGs were also seen, when 
they were invented in the 1970s, as potentially harmful to tertiary hospi-
tals and other referral centers. These hospitals often receive patients with 
medical conditions that make their cases more complicated than those of 
the typical patient. These admissions are paid a higher-revenue DRG. For 
example, rather than a DRG’s paying $17,000 for a heart attack admis-
sion, a complicated DRG might pay $32,000 for a more complicated 
situation. There is a catch, however. There is ambiguity in the deﬁnition 
of complication. A hospital gets paid the higher amount for a patient 
with complications regardless of whether the patient was admitted with 
the complication or the case became complicated by a mistake that the 
hospital itself caused. The patient might start out at a hospital with a 
simple DRG, and if that hospital caused an error, it would be paid an 
extra $15,000. This is just one example of how the incentives for quality 
in our current health care system encourage poor quality. 
In today’s health care market, high quality and improved patient 
health status comprise an externality that is not factored into the proﬁt or 
margin. To develop incentives for quality, this externality must be incor-
porated into the cost of health care production. This is why pay-for-per-
formance initiatives, which align what is paid for with the value that is 
realized, are so important. However, the challenge is that for this to work 
as it should, health IT must be in place to measure health status, so that 
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pay for performance can be implemented. On the other hand, there is no 
incentive for IT investment unless pay for performance or a similar incen-
tive program is in place. This is the core of the market failure for health 
care. Trying to create the economic milieu to make the IT investments 
that are needed and, on the other hand, making sure that value is derived 
from these investments is a very delicate policy effort.
A second challenge to health IT is that there is a negative network 
effect for early adopters. This situation is similar to that of the adoption 
of the fax machine. The ﬁrst person to install a fax machine had no one 
else to whom to send a fax. The last person to buy a fax machine could 
connect with everyone else. The electronic health record is very similar. 
There is a signiﬁcant ﬁrst mover disadvantage—there is no one else who 
can exchange and share data, and there is no infrastructure to which an 
electronic health record can connect. Only a very few, very large, well-
ﬁnanced, high-market-share health care systems can follow a go-it-alone 
strategy of health IT adoption. Thus, the policy challenge is to get a criti-
cal mass of health IT adoption so that this nation can move forward. The 
reasoning is that once health IT adoption reaches the 40 to 50 percent 
range, market forces will take over, because health care IT will become a 
requirement for doing business. Therefore, network economies can work 
as these challenges are met. 
Competitive Threats as a Consequence of Health Care IT
Those are some of the barriers, and they are very large. This economic 
milieu creates risk for other adverse scenarios as well. One such scenario 
is a health IT adoption gap. There is strong evidence that very large health 
systems are adopting electronic health records, bar-code scanning, data 
mining tools, and various sophisticated IT applications that are on a par 
with tools in any other industry in the United States. Large systems—hos-
pitals of more than 400 beds or physician groups with more than 50 phy-
sicians—have about a 60 percent chance of putting these technologies in 
place today. However, small groups and small hospitals have about a 10 
percent chance of adoption. So this gap is large, and it is very real. 
Today, there are examples of completely automated pharmacy systems 
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ﬂoor of a hospital, bar-code administration systems for the caregiver, and 
prescription systems that transmit prescriptions directly to the pharmacy. 
These are state-of-the-art supply chain management ideas applied to the 
very complicated health care industry. It is remarkable, and it is also 
incredibly expensive. Who is doing it? Large, well-ﬁnanced health care 
systems. They are often paid the same way as small hospitals and physi-
cian ofﬁces, on a volume basis, so they have the same negative pro forma 
that is endemic in health care. However, they get strategic beneﬁts that 
small health care systems do not. These strategic beneﬁts include better 
market position, better control of costs, stronger outreach to consumers 
and physicians, better negotiations on health plan contracts, and many 
other forms of market power. Thus, a primary concern is that the adop-
tion gap, whereby large health care systems are adopting IT but indi-
vidual doctors and small hospitals are not, can lead to substantially new 
forms of pressure on health care costs that arise from lessened competi-
tion and even from the potential abuse of market power. This adoption 
gap, with its potential for concentrating market power, is a threat to the 
vision of having IT open up new forms of health care competition around 
quality, which, for the patient and the economy, would lead to a much 
better, more efﬁcient allocation of resources in the market. 
The other challenge is that information on patients is treated as a pro-
prietary good. While federal law suggests that medical information on a 
patient belongs to the patient, it does not quite say that: policy is unclear 
about who owns the data. Patients can clearly have access to their data 
and see the data at any time; they can see who saw the data; they are 
entitled to privacy protections; and they are entitled to giving consent 
at some point in the process of determining when their data are shared. 
However, on a practical basis, when patients try to move from one doctor 
to another, their information does not necessarily follow them. It is risky 
for a patient with ongoing medical conditions to change doctors or to 
come to a hospital. This issue of treating data as a proprietary asset of the 
health system (as opposed to an asset of the patient) is at the very root of 
some of these challenges. This is the basis of the need to create interoper-
ability—the need to establish truly portable data ﬂow. Whether through 
new policies, new infrastructures, or both, the concept is simple: when 
patients show up in any location, unless they choose otherwise, their data 
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should be there, too. This is happening in Indianapolis and a few other 
areas. When a patient arrives in an emergency room in Indianapolis, with 
a swipe of a card doctors or nurses can see all the relevant lab data, hospi-
tal visit data, and pharmacy data. This is only one of many regional proj-
ects underway to share information. These health information exchange 
projects have remarkable life-saving capabilities, and they are reducing 
the need for preventable hospitalizations. This is the beginning of true 
consumer portability that will underlie a real consumer market. 
Consumers need that same capacity to measure quality. What hap-
pened with Doctor X or Hospital Y? Did they do well with their proce-
dures or not? To have a market built around consumer choice, there must 
be comparative information so that people can make choices. It is not 
enough to ﬂip a coin or go to a neighbor to ask which is a good health 
care system. It is important to examine information on treatments (spe-
ciﬁcally, treatments for people with similar conditions); it is important to 
ask how well doctors and hospitals have done on metrics (speciﬁcally, on 
metrics that matter to the patient). If a patient is a diabetic, the physician 
should know to look at hemoglobin A1Cs2—as well as eye exams, foot 
exams, and kidney functions. If a patient is going to be treated for a heart 
condition, she or he will want to know about mortality rates and other 
relevant outcome measures.
Today, only a small fraction of consumers change their behavior based 
on data. Part of the reason is that the data available today are incred-
ibly abstract and very old. They are not state-of-the-art, current, clinical, 
useful, timely data. For consumers to make informed choices, they need 
timely, convenient access to improved data on health care quality.
It is clear that this nation has a lot at stake in terms of keeping the 
health care market from becoming concentrated and proprietary. The 
experience of other industries has shown how having detailed production 
data can change industry power and industry structure. Every consumer 
should be able to have an electronic health record and know how to use 
it. There should be ﬁnancing support for this, and a variety of approaches 
should be considered to make this a reality: top-down, bottom-up, or lat-
eral maneuvers. Some payers are supporting this effort, but not enough. 
Interoperability must be put in place so that the market can operate 
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the patient. The federal government is following suit as well. Today, a 
huge burden is imposed on the private sector by various federal agen-
cies collecting data from doctors, hospitals, labs, and pharmacies—in the 
name of public health improvement, bio-terrorism, and the monitoring 
of adverse events. However, these efforts are piecemeal data collection 
activities that largely collect the same data over and over again using 
various different formats and standards. Clinicians and providers should 
be able to send patient data once, and then the government should ﬁgure 
out all the different uses for which those data are valid and ensure that 
privacy protections are in place to keep the data from being abused. 
There is a long way to go, but a lot is at stake. This issue has great reso-
nance, because it is one of the few things in health care for which there 
is both a well-deﬁned problem and a well-deﬁned solution. This is why 
there is bipartisan support and why the president is taking leadership on 
this: because it is a challenge on which everyone seems to agree that there 
is something positive that can be done. 
There are, however, challenges involved. Let me enumerate and address 
a few of them. One of the challenges is ﬁguring out how we can enable 
consumer choice in a meaningful way without imposing undue risk. I 
have to acknowledge that I do not believe that the presence of IT will 
magically resolve this. We need to recognize that there are two modali-
ties for the market that will probably live side by side. One is that there 
are incredibly well-informed consumers who want to have the shackles 
taken away and want the freedom to make their own decisions. I spend 
time talking with them, and I marvel at how much more they know about 
medicine and about their treatment options than any doctor they have 
ever seen. This small group will probably go out and deﬁne what a true 
consumer market in health care is about. But by no means is this modal-
ity a mass-market phenomenon. Health care, and the health care system, 
is too complicated. I think many people live in denial about health care 
issues. For the people who do not want to be bothered with health care 
issues, consumer choice will be expressed through an agency-mediated 
market, the other modality. One of the things that I very much want to 
see is primary care physicians’ continuing to evolve back to where they 
were in the 1950s, as agents and advocates for patients who are try-
ing to sort out their options. I think that typical patients need an agent 
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whom they trust to act on their behalf and help them navigate among 
the options. Physicians are being nudged back in that direction, and I 
am very encouraged by that. So I think that these two modalities will be 
successful. However, the main question ultimately will not concern these 
modalities. Rather, it will be about what we do to protect those who fall 
into the crevices of this new, high-risk world of health care. That is a 
policy discussion that is yet to be held. 
Another challenge involves successfully implementing health care IT, 
so that both the implementation phase and the operation phase are cost-
effective as well as effective. In many industries and ﬁrms, purchase of IT 
proved to be a waste of money because the technology was not used effec-
tively—what was implemented was the wrong IT solution, was overly 
expensive, and left users without a clue as to how to use it. How can this 
be prevented in health care? This challenge involves picking the right 
product, contracting for it in a meaningful way, implementing it well, and 
deriving value from it. This is my simplistic summary of the life cycle of 
business transformation. Health care fails on every one of these steps. For 
example, there are 300 electronic health record products on the market 
that I know of, and that does not include all the home-grown products. 
Health care providers buy the wrong product virtually all the time. There 
is no price transparency around products, so, literally—particularly for 
small practices—you spend a lot more per unit feature than you get back 
in terms of value added. Physicians do not know how to contract for 
these technologies, so they almost always take unnecessary risks in their 
contracts. And they do not know how to implement. More important, in 
the end, most small hospitals and physicians’ practices see themselves as 
purchasing software rather than as making decisions to reengineer their 
businesses. Now, those of you who have been to a small doctor’s ofﬁce 
know that reengineering it probably does not make sense, because it is 
clear that it was never engineered to start with. But still, by investing in 
IT, these ofﬁces are enabling fundamental changes in how decisions get 
made, how communication occurs, and how the work ﬂows; and they 
do recognize the potential. This is one of the reasons that we have been 
trying to raise awareness that implementing IT is about changing the way 
care is delivered toward a more team-based, collaborative care environ-
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able to be more forward reaching. This is really what is at stake for most 
practices, not whether the physician keeps notes on a computer. 
A third challenge concerns managing the impact of email on health 
care costs. If you talk to people in payment policy in the federal govern-
ment, they will tell you that physician-patient email is one of the new 
ways that health care is going to lose more money. They contend that if 
physicians would get paid for those email visits, the patient would come 
in anyway. In the private sector, however, there is pretty good evidence 
that there is a good substitution between email visits and patients coming 
in. Moreover, from the perspective of a physician’s ofﬁce, it is great to do 
email with patients because they substitute for phone calls. The problem 
of phone calls is that if somebody calls you, you either stop what you are 
doing and take the call or call them back. You call them back; then they 
have to stop what they are doing. Phone calls are synchronous; email is 
asynchronous: we can collect it and do it at the end of the day when we 
want to. Moreover, the way most of the email systems work for doctors 
is that whenever the patient’s email pops up, so does his or her medical 
record, so you have everything you need, right there at your ﬁngertips. 
I am a very strong proponent of physician-patient email, so long as it is 
secure: it cannot be just general email. However, we have a way to go in 
terms of convincing actuaries that, in fact, email is at worst a wash and 
probably a beneﬁt. But I think that a recent article by Milt Freudenheim 
in the New York Times (Freudenheim 2005) is right: this is a wave that 
you cannot stand in front of, because it is good for patients and it is good 
for doctors. 
A fourth challenge is how to protect massive databases on patients 
from the threat of abuse. I have strongly advocated that there not be 
a central database that can be accessed by unknown people. However, 
making data available electronically to the doctors, hospitals, pharma-
cies, and laboratories—to people who have access to the data anyway—is 
one of the key things that we have pushed forward. Right now, every 
doctor, lab, hospital, and pharmacy is involved in data exchange about 
you. I do not know if any of you have ever tracked where your data go, 
and when and to whom, but it is an incredible, astounding experience to 
realize how much paper ﬂows around the health care system with your 
name on it. The point that we are raising is that we need to accomplish 
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that information ﬂow electronically, rather than on paper. We get much 
more value from it when it is done electronically, and the process turns 
out to be more secure. For example, if you went to Kaiser Permanente 
or any of the other major electronic health record implementations that 
are now paperless, the front ofﬁce clerk who registers you and does some 
of the basic administrative work can see only your demographic data—
your name and address and some basics. It used to be that the record 
was sitting there and they could ﬂip through it and see anything they 
wanted. Second, doctors who are not treating you cannot see anything. 
It used to be the case that you could go into the medical records room 
and see anybody’s results any time. Third, there is a log ﬁle of anybody 
who looks at your record electronically. So, when a very famous baseball 
player was admitted for a rotator cuff repair to a hospital in New York a 
few years ago—I will not say who it was—that person’s test results were 
looked at 7,000 times. Now, you might say that was a horrible failure of 
electronic health records, but, in fact, 6,940 people were disciplined and 
a few people were ﬁred over that, because we were actually able to keep 
track of who had seen the data. So, I think part of the calculus is show-
ing the American people that keeping paper records is a very bad privacy 
deal, and that electronics give us a hope in this regard. However, I also 
think there will have to be more beeﬁng up of the privacy infrastructure. 
Ultimately, we will end up in a world—and this is just my opinion, not 
a policy advocacy—where we clearly state: these data belong to you as a 
person, and you decide who gets to see it and when they see it. The data 
could be held by a trust or something similar by you; and you could, by 
swiping a card or going online, make it available to people. We are not 
there yet, but I think that is where we are going to end up. 
A ﬁfth challenge is how to store the data so that we preserve important 
opportunities for research, while abandoning, for reasons of personal 
security, the idea of creating a giant, centralized patient database. I think 
there is a legitimate reason to pull together data that have been rendered 
anonymous, to enable us to judge the efﬁcacy of practice, or to mea-
sure physician or hospital performance. However, the people who hold 
patient data should be obliged to ensure that data going into research 
databases be made anonymous before it ever leaves their doors. What I 
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responsibilities other than health care, that can decide whether or not 
your data are private. We want to keep the responsibility for the privacy 
of patient data at the periphery of the network, with the decision-makers 
who already have the legal obligation to protect your privacy. If the infor-
mation leaves them via electronic means, it should be either in order to go 
to someone who has a legitimate clinical reason for having the data or for 
a research or evaluation purpose, in which case the data would be ren-
dered anonymous before it ever left. Now, will that work? I think society 
needs to have that debate, but that is my view. If health care data are not 
privacy-protected from day one, we cannot even convince ourselves—let 
alone the American people—that an electronic approach is a safe bet. 
A sixth challenge is addressing cultural barriers that are likely to impede 
the meaningful introduction of IT to the health care system. These barri-
ers exist in different forms among the various stakeholders. Let us look 
ﬁrst at doctors. While many other physicians and I are enthusiastic sup-
porters of IT in health care, I can ﬁnd a great number of my peers who 
are mystiﬁed by computers, who do not want to expose the fact that they 
do not know how to type or hold a mouse, or who have been ordering 
the wrong dose of the same drug for 20 years and do not want a com-
puter pointing it out to everybody. I am sorry to say this, but there is 
good evidence that much of this reluctance is basically age based. 
Second, in health care we have enormously complicated environ-
ments of production in terms of the number of decision-makers who are 
involved, the number of processes, and the lack of a well-deﬁned process. 
No other industry could operate in the United States with such a poor 
deﬁnition of what its output is. Moreover, we have economic free-rider 
problems in terms of how we are paid. So, I think we have organiza-
tional, individual, and economic barriers to making the industry efﬁcient 
and customer-responsive. In many ways, health IT is just the name we 
give to the policies and the economic conditions necessary to bring the 
industry into the twenty-ﬁrst century in terms of having modern busi-
ness processes. It is not so much about the IT as it is about the economic 
milieu of the industry and what that means to its culture. 
There is an old saying that I learned at the Wharton School: “Culture 
eats strategy for lunch.” Well, I think that culture eats policy for lunch, 
too; and it is very hard to devise policies that push the industry forward 
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and do not backﬁre and turn into mandates. IT-based changes will be 
unprecedented in terms of the complexity of the industry. On the other 
hand, in a recent global conference in Australia, it was clear that this 
push towards computerization is happening in every modern health care 
system in the world; Australia, Britain, Germany, India, Japan, and South 
Korea are all dealing with exactly the same issues. Some, such as the 
countries of Northern Europe, are ahead of the United States; some lag 
behind. However, all countries are going through the same thing because 
of a tidal wave of consumer awareness about death from preventable 
errors. Moreover, the sense that we can now deal with it is not just an 
American phenomenon. Thus, I think there is something that is a root 
cause of what is happening here and around the world. This gives me 
some optimism that, just on a cultural basis, health care is now ready to 
absorb massive structural change. 
Finally, there is the challenge of countering the tendency to use health 
care information asymmetrically to discriminate against high-cost con-
sumers. My view on this is that health care information is already being 
used asymmetrically. Your health plan knows basically what it needs to 
know. Most health plans have now started bringing lab values into their 
stratiﬁcation and analysis that feed into their actuarial functions. Most 
physicians who are at risk take into account population characteristics 
and may select away from certain types of cases to avoid patients who 
may be a cost or risk burden. I think we live in a world today that is 
asymmetric, and the reason is that the paper process favors those orga-
nizations that can afford to make intelligent use of an incredibly difﬁcult 
information asset—paper. Those who cannot, that is, the retail consumer 
or the simple doctor, are disadvantaged. To me, the value of making 
health care information electronic and standardized is that it can ﬂow 
more freely, lowering the transaction cost of using the information so 
that it becomes more widely available to consumers and health care pro-
viders. That is, introducing electronic data ﬂow to the health care system 
reduces asymmetry. 
One way or the other, we are well into a world in which access to 
information is asymmetric, and I think it is going to get a lot worse with 
large health systems starting to get a leg up in markets as they negotiate 
rates. One concern is that big health systems will start to raise prices 283 David J. Brailer, M.D.
because they know that they control a large enough network. I think this 
is a sleeper issue that will start showing up next year. For me as a physi-
cian, I see both value and waste in health care. On the one hand, I see 
fundamental, wonderful innovations that extend people’s lives. And let’s 
be honest, health care is the only industry that can make our lives longer. 
On the other hand, I cannot be proud of the fact that prices and costs 
are going up in health care because of oligopolistic pressure resulting 
from someone’s now owning a high share of a market, and that is where 
I think we are headed. That is Asymmetry 101. We will see how it plays 
out, but I think that if we do not level the playing ﬁeld for information 
access, we are going to face serious negative consequences. 
■ This paper is an adaptation of an address delivered at the NABE 2005 
Washington Economic Policy Conference at a session sponsored by the 
Altarum Institute. A similar version appeared in the July 1995 issue of 
Business Economics.
Notes
1. The precise mission statement and executive order may be found at http://
www.os.dhhs.gov/healthit/mission.html. Accessed October 9, 2007.
2.  A test for A1C, also known as glycated hemoglobin or glycosylated hemoglo-
bin, that indicates a patient’s blood sugar control.
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